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We follow the Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) 
framework, to estimate marginal productivity differentials and compare 
them to estimated relative wages, in order to provide evidence on 
productivity and non-productivity-based determinations of wages. Special 
emphasis is given in this paper to the effects of human capital variables, 
such as education, experience, and training, on wages and productivity 
differentials. Higher education yields higher productivity; however, highly 
educated workers earn less than their productivity differentials would 
predict. On average, highly educated workers are unable to fully 
appropriate their productivity gains of education through wages. On the 
other hand, workers with more experience are more productive in the same 
proportion that they earn more in medium and large firms, meaning they 
are fully compensated for their higher productivity. Finally, workers in 
micro and small firms are paid more than what their productivity would 
merit. Training benefits firms and employees since it significantly 
increases workers’ productivity and their earnings.  
   1
MEXICO: HUMAN CAPITAL EFFECTS ON WAGES AND 
PRODUCTIVITY 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Human capital is a stock of skills produced by education, experience and training 
(Welch, 1970; Mincer, 1989). The empirical evidence on the links between human 
capital, on the one hand, and productivity and/or wage growth on the other, is strong.  
Human capital is viewed not only as an investment, but also as a factor of 
production. Numerous studies using worker and firm level data have shown that more 
educated and/or trained individuals are more productive. In a work environment that is 
rapidly changing due to technological advances, the cognitive abilities for workers to 
process new information become increasingly important and thus command higher 
wages, and in turn higher incomes (Welch, 1970; Mincer, 1989; Tan and López-Acevedo, 
2002; Hellerstein and Neumark, 2004). Moreover, highly educated workers have a 
comparative advantage with respect to the adjustment and implementation of new 
technologies, by being able to adopt them more easily or faster than non-educated 
workers. For this reason, the productivity of highly educated workers, relative to less-
educated workers, is greater (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987, Tan and López-Acevedo, 
2002; Hellerstein and Neumark, 2004).  
Similarly, there is limited, but growing, empirical literature on the link between 
human capital and a firms’ performance (Koning, 1994; Ravenga, 1995; Batra and Tan, 
1995; Barrett and O’Connell, 1998; World Bank, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2000, 2001a, 
2001b; Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen, 2000). Using panel data, several studies have 
demonstrated the positive impact of education and training on productivity (Nielsen and 
Rosholm, 2002; Batra and Tan, 1995; Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen, 2000).  
In addition, extensive literature has been compiled in the closely related field of 
human capital and its effects on workers’ wages. A near-consensus suggests that earnings 
increase with more training (Middleton et al., 1993; Dar et al., 2000; Nielsen and 
Rosholm, 2001).    2
The problem with the traditional approach of estimating wage regressions to test 
theories of wage determination is that, without independent measures of worker 
productivity, it is difficult to determine whether wage differentials associated with 
workers’ characteristics reflect productivity differential or some other factors. For 
example, typical wage regressions report positive coefficients on age (conditional on a 
variety of controls). These positive coefficients neither imply that older workers are more 
productive than younger ones, nor that wages rise faster than productivity. Similarly, 
without direct measures of the relative productivity of workers, factors associated to 
wage differentials cannot be established.  
Verner (1999) analyzes the determinants of wages and productivity in Zimbabwe, 
using a matched employee-employer manufacturing sector data, the Regional Program on 
Enterprise Development (RPED) survey data from 1993. The number of firms and 
employees interviewed are 201 and 1609, respectively. In each firm, about 10 randomly 
selected workers from different occupational categories are interviewed to obtain the 
worker level data. Here workers are the unit of observation and firms are included in the 
individual vector of variables. The main conclusions from this study were that formal 
education, training, and experience impact wages and productivity positively, and that 
females were being paid less than male employees, despite that females are not 
measurably less productive. This analysis is innovative; nonetheless, this model uses 
firm-level productivity as a measure of the individual productivity, while the worker 
characteristics variables and the endogenous wage variable are at the individual level – 
regardless of the differences in education and training, all workers in the firm are 
assigned the same productivity measure. The problem is that the effect of worker 
characteristics on productivity will not be properly identified when there is no variation 
in the workers’ productivity within a firm but differences in workers’ characteristics 
exist.
1  
Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) use a unique plant-level dataset in the 
United States, the Worker Establishment Characteristics Database (WECD), which 
matches long-form respondents to the 1990 Decennial Census of Population to data on 
                                                 
1 Verner (2000) uses the same methodology to analyze wages and productivity gaps in Ghana.    3
their employers from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD). Since they have plant-
level information on costs, they can estimate plant-level earnings equations, which 
represent the aggregation of individual-level wage equations over workers employed in a 
plant. It is worth pointing out that Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) estimate the 
wage regression at the worker and firm levels to test the robustness of the firm-level 
estimations and do not find significant differences. They proposed an innovative model 
discussed in Section IV to estimate firm level equations since productivity is available at 
the firm level only. The model, based on traditional economic theory, includes an 
extended Cobb-Douglas production function and a standard wage determination model. 
By simultaneously estimating production functions and wage equations at the plant level, 
they compare relative marginal products to relative wages of different types of workers, 
leading to new evidence on productivity-based and nonproductivity-based explanations 
of the determination of wages. This represents an improvement over Verner (1999) since 
it allows for variation in human capital characteristics to have a differentiated impact in 
worker productivity. They find that the higher wages of medium-aged and older workers 
is justified by their higher relative productivity. On the other hand, even though women 
earn lower wages, they are not significantly less productive, indicating the existence of 
discrimination.
2  
This paper follows Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske’s (1999) approach to the 
study of wage regressions by linking them to productivity functions. This paper uses a 
unique Mexican data set that combines data on manufacturing firms and their workers to 
estimate relative marginal products and compare them with relative wages. The paper is 
organized as follows: section II introduces the data, section III presents the variables used 
in this work along with some descriptive statistics, section IV presents the framework and 
explains the methodology, section V analyzes the results, in general, by firm size and 
examines training by gender, and section VI offers conclusions.  
                                                 
2 Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) use the same methodology to test for gender discrimination in Israel. 
Hellerstein and Neumark (2004) use the 1990 Decennial Employer-Employee Dataset (DEED), a more 
recently constructed matched employer/employee data set for the United States that contains detailed 
demographic information on workers (most notably, information on education). Using the same 
methodology, they use the new to update and expand on previous findings.    4
II.  DATA 
This paper uses the latest National Survey of Employment, Wages, Technology 
and Training (ENESTYC), fielded in 2001. The ENESTYC is a periodic establishment 
survey fielded by INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática) on 
behalf of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. The ENESTYC’s universe is the 
manufacturing establishments numbered in the Economic Census updated with the EIM – 
Encuesta Industrial Mensual – and with information from the petrochemical industries. 
The sampling design is random and stratified for each of the 54 activity branches of the 
Clasificación Mexicana de Actividades y Productos (CMAP) 1994 and by firm size. The 
sample size for 2001 was 8,179 firms, which represents 333,647 firms. As its name 
suggests, ENESTYC contains detailed information about the firm – production, output 
and input cost, capital assets, size, location, division of activity, ownership, technology
3, 
quality control methods and ISO 9000 certification, and research and development – and 
attributes of the workforce – gender, wage and non-wage compensation by occupation 
and gender, and training, both in-house training and external formal training.  
In both 1993 and 1999, INEGI selected a sub-sample of the establishments 
interviewed in the ENESTYC. From each of those firms, a randomly selected sample of 
10 workers from different occupational categories was interviewed to elicit the National 
Survey of Employment to Workers in the Manufacturing Sector (ENTRAM). This is a 
worker level dataset which includes information on basic data of the worker, educational 
level, job conditions, remunerations, training, and work history. Though the linked 
ENESTYC-ENTRAM yields an employee-employer dataset with very rich information at 
the worker level, it was not suitable for our analysis because the methodology in Section 
IV requires data for the entire workforce and the ENESTYC-ENTRAM only has only a 
small sample of workers by firm, especially for the larger firms, which would produce an 
incomplete characterization of the firms’ workforce. The excellent quality of the 
ENESTYC and the detail of the information elicited allow us to estimate plant-level 
                                                 
3 Such as use of different types of technology (manual equipment to robots) and ICT, including workplace 
practices.   5
production function and earning equations as in Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske 
(1999).  
The information on individual establishments that INEGI gathers through its 
questionnaires (which firms are required to answer by law) is legally confidential. 
Therefore, we followed an established procedure in which most data analysis was done at 
INEGI’s Aguascalientes headquarters with the support of INEGI personnel. Nevertheless, 
the reader should bear in mind the limitations for data analysis imposed by this 
institutional arrangement.  
III.  WORKERS’ AND FIRMS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
The observation unit in ENESTYC is the firm, and includes detailed information 
on the characteristics of its workforce. The workers’ characteristics included human 
capital characteristics: education, experience, and training; and gender, whether the 
employee belongs to a union and the type of contract. We used the firm-level data, the 
shares of the workforce with these attributes.  
The training analysis focuses on formal training only, which is the training 
provided by ‘training professionals.’ Formal in-house training courses are given by 
specialized firm personnel (not peers), while external training describes formal training 
courses given by professional external agents, which is mostly provided by private 
institutions.  
The distribution of workers’ characteristics is tabulated, with sampling weights, in 
Table 1. We find the percentage of women employees is significantly less than men, with 
men representing nearly 73 percent of the workforce. With respect to educational 
attainment, 71 percent of the employees had no more than lower secondary education, 
while 19 percent of them received upper secondary education and the remaining 10 
percent of employees received university-level education. The majority of workers in 
these firms (48 percent) had less than three years of experience in the firm, while only 15 
percent had worked more than ten years in that firm.   6
TABLE 1.  DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
Gender     Training    
Women 27.2%  None  41.1% 
Men 72.8%  In-house  training  39.8% 
Education     External  formal training  19.1% 
Lower secondary or less  71.2%  Belonging to a union    
Upper secondary  18.6%  No  57.8% 
University or more  10.2%  Yes  42.2% 
Experience in the firm     Type of Contract    
Three years or less   47.6%  Temporary  10.7% 
From 3 to 10 years  37.5% Permanent  89.3% 
More than 10 years  14.9%       
Source: Calculations based on ENESTYC 2001. 
 
According to the survey, we estimate that the majority of employees receive some 
form of training, though most was internal. The share of employees receiving formal in-
house-sponsored training was 40 percent, while the number not receiving any training 
was roughly the same at 41 percent, with only one-fifth of employees receiving external 
formal training. The differences in education and training (both in-house and external) 
are very small between women and men in Mexico. In-house training was 40 percent for 
men and 36 percent for women, while external training was 20 and 16 percent, 
respectively.  
Less than half of these employees, 42 percent, were unionized. Also, 89 percent 
were employed via permanent forms of contracts.  
The characteristics of a firm used in this analysis are size, division of activity, 
region, whether the foreign capital of the firm exceeds one-half, if the firm exports over 
50 percent of its output, investment in research and development (R&D), quality control 
certification, and technology adoption.    7
TABLE 2.  DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
Size      Region    
Micro (less than 16 employees)  90.2%  North  19.3% 
Small (16-100 employees)  7.8%  Center  49.2% 
Medium (100-250 employees)  1.2%  South  21.0% 
Large (more than 250 employees)  0.7%  Mexico City   10.6% 
Division of activity   Firm's exports are more than 50% of output 
Food, beverages, and tobacco 35.6%  No    99.1% 
Textiles, clothing and leather  14.3%  Yes  0.9% 
Wood and wood products  12.9%  The firm invests in research & development 
Paper, paper products, printing, and publishing  6.8%  No  92.8% 
Chemicals, oil derivatives, and coal  3.2%  Yes  7.2% 
Non-metallic mineral products  8.1%  The firm has quality control certifications  
Basic metallic industries  0.1%  No  96.8% 
Metallic products, machinery, and equipment.  17.3%  Yes  3.3% 
Other manufacturing industries  1.8%  The firm adopted new technology since 1999  
Foreign capital is over 50%   No  61.6% 
No   99.5%    Yes  38.4% 
Yes 0.5%       
Source: Calculations based on ENESTYC 2001. 
 
With respect to firm size, 90 percent are micro in size, 8 percent are considered 
small, 1 percent medium, and almost 1 percent large, which is consistent with economic 
census data. Of these, the majority of manufacturing firms seem to be most concentrated 
in Central Mexico, accounting for 49 percent of the total, with the remainder evenly 
distributed between the Northern and Southern regions, and Mexico City. According to 
the division of activity, food, beverages and tobacco account for the largest share of firms 
with 36 percent; metallic products, machinery and equipment come second with 17 
percent. Basic metallic industry ranks last, with only 0.1 percent. With respect to foreign 
openness, the percentage of firms with more than 50 percent foreign capital is only 0.5 
percent and only 1 percent of firms export at least half of their output. The share of firms 
that invest in research and development (R&D) is 7 percent, whereas the percentage of 
firms that adopted new technologies is 38 percent. Only 3 percent of the firms have some 
quality control certification.  
IV.  FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
We follow Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske’s (1999) model to compare the 
relative marginal products and relative wages of workers. Consider a simple economy   8
with firms that produce output with only two types of workers, A and B, which are 
perfect substitutes. Let φ  be the marginal product of type A relative to type B and λ  be 
the relative wage. If  λ φ = , firms in this economy will be indifferent among any 
combination of type A and type B under a profit-maximizing or cost-minimizing 
behavior.
4 However, if the inequality does not hold, firms will hire only one kind of 
labor. Then, the only equilibrium in this economy is when the marginal product equals 
the relative wage.  
Whenever wage and productivity differentials are not equal then there is a 
deviation from the competitive spot labor markets assumption. It can be the case that 
long-term contracts justify a lower relative wage in exchange for job security, or that 
firms and workers do not share evenly the benefit from some productivity-enhancing trait 
– such as better training – because of unequal bargaining power.  
We use simultaneous non-linear production functions and earnings equations at 
the plant level to obtain estimates of parameters φ  (marginal productivity of one type of 
worker relative to the base case) and λ  (relative wage of one type of worker to the base 
case) using maximum likelihood methods. The equations that make up the system are the 
following
5:  
μ β γ α φ + Χ ⋅ + + + = ) ( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( g QL K a Y   (1) 
ε λ + + = ) ln( ' ) ln( QL a w      (2) 
where: 
Y   value added productivity in the firm 
w  wages paid to all workers in the firm
6 
K   capital (fixed assets) 
                                                 
4 Whenever  1 ≠ φ , we say that the types of labor are distinguished by a different quality of labor.  
5 The production function is an extended Cobb-Douglas function. The wage equation is a definitional 
equation, not a behavioral equation. Suppose two types of labor, A and B. Then, if we define wages in a 
firm as the weighted average of each type of labor’s wages: 
[ ] A B A B A B B B A A L L w L L w L w L w L w w ) 1 ( ) ( − + = − + = + = λ λ . In logs and aggregating over all 
firms, this would yield equation (2) with the quality of labor aggregate as defined in (3) below.  
6 In the survey, all monetary figures are in nominal terms, corresponding to December 2000, except for the 
wages which are presented in June 2000 prices. Therefore, to express the wages in December 2000 prices 
as well we used wage price indices produced by Banco de México.    9
i QL   quality of employment aggregates (see below for detailed explanation)  
Χ  vector of variables associated to the firm (size, region, manufacturing sub-
sector, proxies for openness of the firm, technology adoption, quality 
control, and R&D) 
For each firm, the measure of productivity used was value added productivity, 
which was calculated as the value of production minus the cost of materials. The wage 
variable is calculated as the sum of all wages, salaries, and compensations paid by the 
firm to its workforce.  
The quality of labor aggregate takes into account the productivity of different 
types of labor. Take the simple economy set up above. Quality of employment is defined 




⎡ − + = + =
L
L
L L L QL
A
B A 1 1 φ φ φ     (3) 
where: 
L  total workers in the firm 
A L   type A workers in the firm  
B L   type B in the firm
7 
φ   is the marginal productivity of type A workers relative to type B 
By substituting (3) into (1), we obtain a non-linear production function from 
which we can estimate φ , using firm-level data on value added, capital, and the number 
of workers and type decomposition of the workforce. Similarly, the quality of labor is 




⎡ − + = + =
L
L
L L L QL
A
B A 1 1 λ λ λ     (4) 
However, we want to test these relationships for more than two types of labor. 
The types of labor are characterized by different categories in the following 
characteristics:  
                                                 
7  B L , the number of type B workers in the firm is the reference group.    10
(i)  gender: women or men  
(ii)  education: complete lower-secondary or less; upper-secondary; or tertiary 
education  
(iii)  experience: less than three years working in the firm; three to ten years; or 
more than ten years  
(iv)  training: none; in-house; or external formal training  
(v)  belonging to a union: no or yes  
(vi)  type of contract: temporary or permanent  
The rationale for the choice of the above variables has been well documented in 
several studies since they have an impact in either wages or productivity of the workers. 
Gender might reveal information on a possible gender wage gap (Katz and Correia, 
2001). Human capital is important to enhance productivity and long-term economic 
growth (Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen, 2004). A more educated work force increases 
worker productivity and facilitates the adoption and use of new technologies. Higher 
skilled workers can more easily adjust to changes in the economy than less skilled 
workers. Institutions such as union membership might be important in determining wages 
(Maloney and Pontual, 1999). Long-run employment relationships might be beneficial for 
both employers and employees, helping to build and retain firm-specific skills (Verner, 
2000), which implies that permanent contracts might affect productivity. Also, we have 
controlled for other worker and firm characteristics, such as size, region, sector of 
activity, R&D, export orientation, technology adoption, firm ownership, and quality 
control.  
Thus, the composition of the workforce would be characterized by the share of 
workers in each of the 216 possible combinations or types of labor. Consideration of 
many variables poses a critical challenge in terms of the data since the characterization of 
the workforce encompasses 216 categories. From ENESTYC we cannot obtain the 
number of workers in every narrowly defined subgroup (i.e. number of women with 
lower secondary or less, less than three years of experience, with no training, not 
belonging to a union and with a temporary contract; etc.). To reduce the dimensionality 
of the problem, we make two assumptions as Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske did:    11
•  The relative marginal products of two types of workers within one demographic 
group are equal to the relative marginal products of those same two types of 
workers within another demographic group.  
•  The proportion of workers in an establishment defined by a demographic group is 
constant across all other groups.  
Then, the quality of labor term for both equations would be:  
() () () () ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − + × × ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − + − + × ⎥ ⎦
⎤
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2 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 3 2 2 λ λ λ λ λ K  (6) 
where:  
L  total workers in the firm 
2 G   number of male workers 
2 E   number of workers with upper-secondary 
3 E   number of workers with tertiary education 
M  
2 P   number of permanent workers in the firms 
i φ   is the marginal productivity of the i
th group relative to the base case
8 
i λ   is the relative wage of the i
th group relative to the base case 
Notice that the setup of the equation system implies that productivity and wage 
differentials between groups are indicated when the estimate of the relevant ϕ  or λ  is 
significantly different from one (rather than zero). The advantage of estimating wages 
and productivity simultaneously is that we can test the hypothesis of equality of 
productivity and wage differentials. Whenever  λ φ = , there is a deviation from the 
competitive spot labor markets assumption.  
                                                 
8 The reference group for the worker characteristics includes women, with lower secondary or less, until 
three years working experience in the firm, does not belong to a union, without training, and temporary 
worker.   12
It should be noted that the identification of productivity differentials associated 
with characteristics comes from covariation across firms.
9 If we find evidence suggesting 
that, for example, women are less productive than men, the firm-level data does not 
enable us to determine whether the estimated lower productivity of women comes from 
the segregation of women into low-productivity firms, or from the lower productivity of 
women relative to men within firms. This should be considered when interpreting the 
results.  
V.  RESULTS 
The production function (1) and the wage equation (2) were estimated jointly, 
with the quality of labor aggregate as defined by (5) and (6) respectively, for all firms in 
ENESTYC 2001. Table 3 below shows the estimates for the marginal productivity 
differentials and relative wages, φ  and λ , respectively for the characteristics which 
affect employee performance and/or wage negotiations: (i) gender, (ii) schooling, (iii) 
experience, and (iv) training.
10 The full results of the estimation are shown in Table A.1. 
The last column presents an asterisk if we reject the null hypothesis of equality between 
the productivity and wage differentials.  
                                                 
9 This means that all workers within a firm are associated to the same productivity level. Therefore, the 
estimated productivity differential is related to productivity differences between firms, not within.  
10 As explained in the previous section, we include many other worker and firm characteristics for a 
complete identification of the model. However, the object of this paper is only gender, schooling, 
experience, and training. The analysis of the effect of other characteristics is the scope of another study.   13
TABLE 3.  MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALS AND RELATIVE WAGES 
   Productivity      Relative  Reject 
Variable Differential    Wage  i i o H λ φ = :   
Ho: coefficient=1             
2.05 *   1.52 *  *  Men 
(0.13)        (0.04)       
1.84 *   1.44 *  *  Upper secondary 
(0.13)        (0.04)       
3.82 *   2.37 *  *  University or more 
(0.28)     (0.07)    
1.12 *   1.19 *    (3 - 10] years in the firm 
(0.05)     (0.03)    
0.76 *   0.97   *  (10 - +) years in the firm 
(0.04)     (0.02)    
1.25 *   1.16 *    In-house training 
(0.06)     (0.03)    
1.49 *   1.24 *  *  External formal training 
(0.08)     (0.04)    
Adjusted R
2 0.90      0.96    
Observations 6,866          
Notes: 
Calculations based on ENESTYC 2001. 
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
The Wald statistic was used to test the equality of the estimated wage and productivity differential.  
Reference group: women, lower secondary or less, until three years of experience in the firm, and 
without any form of training.  
 
With respect to gender, the results show that men are significantly more 
productive – 105 percent – than women. Likewise, their wages are 52 percent higher, but 
not as high as their productivity (we reject the equality of both differentials). This implies 
that even though men are better paid relative to women because they are more 
productive, their salary increase does not fully compensate for their higher productivity.  
In the case of education, the results show that workers with upper secondary 
education are 84 percent more productive with respect to the base case (the base case 
being workers with lower secondary or less) and workers with higher education are 282 
percent more productive with respect to the base case. However, they earn less compared 
to what can be justified by the productivity differentials. These workers earn 44 percent 
and 137 percent more respectively. On average, the workers are not able to fully 
appropriate the productivity gains of education through wages. This issue might point to 
institutional rigidities that are beyond the scope of this paper.    14
As for experience, we also find some interesting results. Workers with three to ten 
years of tenure in the firm are 12 percent more productive and earn 19 percent more than 
those with less than three years of experience. However, there is no evidence to reject the 
equality of both differentials; meaning that if they are paid more it is because they are 
proportionately more productive. This is consistent within a competitive labor market. On 
the other hand, workers with more than 10 years of tenure are 24 percent less productive 
and earn practically the same as those with less than three years of experience. In this 
case, these workers are paid more than what their productivity would merit. We might 
venture to say that workers with more years in the firm have a higher bargaining power 
with their employers, thus allowing them to negotiate higher wages than their 
productivity justifies. This issue will be discussed further in the paper.  
Training benefits firms and employees since it significantly increases workers’ 
productivity and their earnings. Workers that have received in-house training are 25 
percent more productive and earn 16 percent more than those without any form of 
training. Those workers that have received external formal training are 49 percent more 
productive and earn 24 percent higher wages. Notice that for those workers with in-house 
training, the differentials are similar, but for those with external formal training the wage 
differential is lower than the productivity differential. This implies that both workers and 
employers share equally the benefits of in-house training, but that employers receive a 
higher proportion of the benefits of external formal training. However, we do not know 
the distribution of the cost of this training. Generally, we would expect that the larger 
share of the cost, if not all, is covered by the employer. Thus, this uneven sharing of 
benefits from training could be reflecting the fact that the employer is recovering the 
investment in training.  
a.  Results by Firm Size 
The results presented above aggregate across all firm sizes. However, firms vary 
considerably by size. For this reason, in order to avoid aggregation biases we decided to 
analyze the impact of the above-mentioned variables on wages and productivity 
differentials by firm size. We adjusted by doing estimations for two separate groups:   15
micro or small firms and medium or large firms. The human capital effects are shown in 
Table 4; the complete results are shown in Tables A.2 and A.3.  
TABLE 4.  MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALS AND RELATIVE WAGES BY 
FIRM SIZE 
   Micro and Small Firms     Medium and Large Firms 
  Productivity     Relative  Reject    Productivity     Relative  Reject 
Variable Differential      Wage  i i o H λ φ = :       Differential     Wage  i i o H λ φ = :   
Ho: coefficient=1 
1.68 *    1.33  *  *   2.22 *    1.57 *  *  Men 
(0.16)     (0.05)        (0.24)    (0.07)     
1.61 *    1.36  *     2.22 *    1.46 *  *  Upper 
secondary  (0.18)     (0.07)        (0.24)    (0.06)     
3.06 *    1.99  *  *   5.09 *    2.72 *  *  University or 
more  (0.35)     (0.11)        (0.57)    (0.11)     
1.03     1.19  *  *    1.25  *    1.15  *    (3 - 10] years 
in the firm  (0.07)     (0.04)        (0.10)    (0.04)     
0.5 *    0.81  *  *    1.56  *    1.39  *    (10 - +) years 
in the firm  (0.05)     (0.03)        (0.13)    (0.05)     
1.27 *    1.19  *     1.25 *    1.13 *  *  In-house 
training  (0.11)     (0.05)        (0.07)    (0.03)     
1.55 *    1.29  *  *   1.44 *    1.19 *  *  External formal 
training  (0.15)     (0.07)        (0.09)    (0.03)     
Adjusted R
2 0.84      0.93       0.69      0.82     
Observations  3,301            3,565          
Notes: 
Calculations based on ENESTYC 2001. 
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
 The Wald statistic was used to test the equality of the estimated wage and productivity differential. 
Reference group: women, lower secondary or less, until three years of experience in the firm, and without 
training.  
 
In the case of gender, the main conclusion still holds independent of firm size. 
The higher wages of men is explained by their higher productivity relative to women. 
Nevertheless, the productivity differential for men with respect to women is larger than 
the wage differential. However, for micro and small firms, the differentials are much 
smaller: 68 percent for productivity, and 33 for wages. The medium and large firms have 
slightly higher differentials than before: 122 percent for productivity and 57 percent for 
wages.  
The results for education demonstrate a robust relationship between higher 
education and higher productivity. The major difference is that in micro and small firms 
we cannot reject the equality of the productivity and wage differentials for workers with   16
upper secondary. This implies that they are fully compensated for their increased 
productivity over those workers with lower secondary education or less. The differentials 
are much larger in medium and large firms than before, showing that education has a 
higher impact in productivity and is more valued in larger firms.  
Regarding experience, the story changes slightly. Workers with three to ten years 
of experience are not more productive than those with less experience in the micro and 
small firms. But they are paid 19 percent more, which is not justified given their lack of 
incremental productivity. Workers with ten or more years of experience in micro and 
small firms are 50 percent less productive, but only earn 19 percent less, implying they 
too are overpaid. In medium and large firms, workers with more experience are more 
productive in the same proportion that they earn more, meaning they are fully 
compensated. There is no evidence to reject the equality of the differentials.  
In micro and small firms, workers with in-house training are 27 percent more 
productive and earn 19 percent more than those without any form of training. Those with 
external formal training are 55 percent more productive and earn 29 percent higher 
wages. Those workers with in-house training earn as much as their productivity 
differential, but for those with external formal training the productivity differential is 
higher than the wage differential. This suggests an important point – that both workers 
and employers share equally the benefits of in-house training, but that employers receive 
a higher proportion of the benefits of external formal training; a consistent finding. In 
medium and large firms, workers with in-house training are 25 percent more productive 
and earn 13 percent more than those without any training. Those with external formal 
training are 44 percent more productive and earn 19 percent higher wages. For both types 
of training, the productivity differential is larger than the wage differential, meaning that 
employers receive a higher proportion of the benefits of any kind of training. One 
implication of the external training results is that policies that encourage increased 
training will lead to larger productivity gains for the economy. Gains that firms receive 
from training are shared with employees in the form of higher pay.    17
b.  Training by Gender 
The reason behind the two, rather limiting, assumptions imposed in this paper 
(introduced in section IV) is due to data limitations. For each firm, we do not have data 
on the actual number of workers in each of the possible combinations of the demographic 
characteristics. However, there is enough data to relax these assumptions allowing 
variations for training by gender. Therefore, we present this exercise to asses the 
restrictiveness of our assumptions and whether there are important effects on the 
estimates.  
Now, suppose the workforce is distinguished by gender –  1 G  and  2 G  – and 
training
11 –  1 T  and  2 T . Then the quality of labor aggregate (when the base case is non-
trained women) would be defined as:  
() () () ⎥ ⎦
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⎢ ⎣
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φ φ φ φ φ  (6) 
where: 
1 2 T G I   number of non-trained men 
2 1 T G I   number of trained women 
2 2 T G I   number of trained men 
The first assumption implies that  1


































2 1 2 1 I . Substituting this into (6) we obtain a 
similar equation to (4).  
As we mentioned previously, our aim is to investigate the effects of training on 
productivity and wages, for women and men separately. The main results are in Table 5 
below and the complete results presented in Tables A.4-A.6. 
                                                 
11 In this example we only distinguish training vs. no training for sake of simplicity.    18
TABLE 5.  MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALS AND RELATIVE WAGES 
FOR TRAINING BY GENDER 
   Productivity     Relative  Reject 
Variable Differential      Wage  i i o H λ φ = :   
Ho: coefficient=1                
1.97  *   1.54  *  *  Men within non-trained workers 
(0.15)     (0.04)    
1.14     1.23 *   In-house training within women 
(0.17)     (0.08)    
1.25     1.23 *   External formal training within women 
(0.29)     (0.13)    
1.28  *   1.14 * *  In-house training within men 
(0.07)     (0.03)    
1.55  *   1.24 * *  External formal training within men 
(0.10)     (0.05)    
Adjusted R
2 0.90      0.96    
Observations 6,662          
Notes: 
Calculations based on ENESTYC 2001. 
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 5 percent level. 
The Wald statistic was used to test the equality of the estimated wage and productivity differential. 
Reference group: women without training.  
 
As can be seen in the table, among workers that received no training, men are 97 
percent more productive and earn 54 percent higher wages. These results are consistent 
with what was previously found on the effects of gender, even among those workers that 
have received no training. In the same way, the results for education and experience are 
practically the same as we had before. This shows that our model is robust to the 
assumptions that we made.  
With respect to training, there is no evidence that women who receive either in-
house or external formal training are more productive than those without training. 
However, even though they are paid 23 percent more, we cannot reject the equality of the 
wage and productivity differentials. This means that both trained women and their 
employers share the benefits equally. As for men, those with in-house training are 28 
percent more productive, and those with external formal training, are 55 percent more 
productive. Respectively, men earn 14 percent and 24 percent higher wages. In this case, 
there is significant evidence that the productivity differential is larger than the wage 
differential. The results are very similar to the ones we had before relaxing the 
assumptions.   19
VI.  CONCLUSIONS  
Using manufacturing sector data, this paper examined the determinants of wages 
and productivity differentials in Mexico. We used both worker and firm characteristics in 
our model specification, to see whether the wage differentials were justified by the 
productivity differentials. 
First, men are better paid relative to women because they are significantly more 
productive. However, their salary increase does not fully compensate for their higher 
productivity. There is no evidence of gender discrimination in Mexico since wage 
differentials are explained by equal or larger productivity differentials, though this is a 
topic for further research.  
Second, the wage premium increased with additional years of schooling. 
Additional years of schooling were also shown to increase productivity. Wages 
associated with years of schooling do not, however, have similar significant positive 
effects: workers with upper secondary education were found to be 84 percent more 
productive (than the base case), and workers with higher education were found to be 282 
percent more productive. Yet, they earn 44 percent and 137 percent more respectively. 
On average, the workers are not able to fully appropriate the productivity gains of 
education through wages. This issue deserves further research beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
Third, workers with more experience are more productive in the same proportion 
that they earn more in medium and large firms, meaning they are fully compensated. On 
the other hand, workers in micro and small firms are paid more than what their 
productivity would merit. Those with more than 10 years of tenure are 50 percent less 
productive and earn only 20 percent less than those with less than three years of 
experience. Workers with three to 10 years of experience are equally productive, but earn 
20 percent higher wages in micro and small firms. These findings should be investigated 
in more detail.  
Fourth, both employees and employers benefited the most from external formal 
training. For both types of training, the productivity differential is larger than the wage 
differential, meaning that employers receive a higher proportion of the benefits of any   20
kind of training. In general, the trends indicate lack of adequate compensation for 
training, both in-house and external among employees. However, the differential is 
highest among workers in medium and large firms who see a wage increase of less than 
half their improvement in productivity. Among men, workers with in-house training are 
28 percent more productive, and those with external formal training are 55 percent more 
productive. Respectively, they earn 14 percent and 24 percent higher wages, indicating a 
significantly larger productivity differential than wage differential. However, among 
women, training does not significantly increase productivity.  
The results showed that education and external formal training are positively 
associated with wages and productivity. Training effects are significantly larger for 
productivity than for wages, suggesting that the employers benefit more from external 
formal training than workers. However, the type of training also has a major influence on 
the productivity outcome. Formal external training has the highest productivity gains, 
while in-house training has the lower (though still high) gains. This leads us to think that 
Mexico underinvests in training given the large returns.  
Furthermore, the results on the effects of training by gender remained robust as 
compared to the previous estimates. This finding shows that our model is robust to the 
assumptions that we made. Therefore, this analysis provides robust insights into the 
determinants of wage and productivity differentials in Mexico.   21
VII.  APPENDIX 
TABLE A.1.  JOINT PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND WAGE EQUATION ESTIMATES 
   Productivity equation (1)    Wages equation (2)     Prob. 
Variable  Coef.  Std. Error Prob.    Coef.  Std. Error Prob.      i i o H λ φ = :  
Worker characteristics (Ho: coefficient=1)            
Men 2.05  0.13  0.000    1.52  0.04  0.000    0.00 
Upper secondary  1.84  0.13  0.000    1.44  0.04  0.000    0.00 
University or more  3.82  0.28  0.000    2.37  0.07  0.000    0.00 
(3 - 10] years in the firm  1.12  0.05  0.018    1.19  0.03  0.000    0.18 
(10 - +) years in the firm  0.76  0.04  0.000    0.97  0.02  0.197    0.00 
Union 1.32  0.06  0.000    1.21  0.03  0.000    0.05 
In-house training  1.25  0.06  0.000    1.16  0.03  0.000    0.11 
External formal training  1.49  0.08  0.000    1.24  0.04  0.000    0.00 
Permanent worker   1.50  0.13  0.000    1.10  0.04  0.011    0.00 
Firm characteristics (Ho: coefficient=0)              
Capital assets  0.20  0.01  0.000             
Small firm  0.55  0.05  0.000    0.50  0.02  0.000     
Medium firm  0.65  0.07  0.000    0.62  0.02  0.000     
Large firm  0.70  0.10  0.000    0.71  0.02  0.000     
North Region  0.39  0.04  0.000    0.35  0.02  0.000     
Center Region  0.36  0.04  0.000    0.33  0.02  0.000     
Mexico City  0.55  0.05  0.000    0.39  0.02  0.000     
Sector  32  -0.31 0.04 0.000    -0.22 0.02 0.000     
Sector  33  -0.46 0.05 0.000    -0.13 0.03 0.000     
Sector 34  -0.01  0.05  0.870    0.13  0.03  0.000     
Sector 35  -0.04  0.04  0.321    0.09  0.02  0.000     
Sector  36  -0.50 0.05 0.000    -0.05 0.03 0.096     
Sector 37  0.05  0.09  0.569    0.03  0.06  0.663     
Sector  38  -0.29 0.03 0.000    -0.06 0.02 0.001     
Sector  39  -0.33 0.10 0.001    -0.06 0.06 0.255     
More than 50% of foreign capital  0.00  0.00  0.000    0.00  0.00  0.000     
The firm exports at least 50% of its 
products  -0.02 0.05 0.679    0.02 0.03 0.357     
Research and development  0.02  0.03  0.549    0.04  0.02  0.020     
Quality Control  0.17  0.03  0.000    0.11  0.02  0.000     
Technology adoption  0.11  0.03  0.000    0.06  0.01  0.000      
Adjusted R
2 0.90        0.96         
Number of observations (firms)  6,866                        
Notes: 
Calculations based on ENESTYC 2001. The Wald statistic was used to test the equality of the estimated 
wage and productivity differential. 
Reference group for the worker characteristics: women, lower secondary or less, until three years working 
experience in the firm, does not belong to a union, without training, temporary worker. 
Reference group for the firm characteristics: micro firms, South region, sector 31, the firm exports less than 
50% of its products, does no research and development, no quality control, no technology adoption. 
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TABLE A.2.  JOINT PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND WAGE EQUATION ESTIMATES 
MICRO AND SMALL FIRMS 
   Productivity equation (1)    Wages equation (2)     Prob. 
Variable  Coef.  Std. Error  Prob.    Coef.  Std. Error  Prob.     i i o H λ φ = :  
Worker characteristics (Ho: coefficient=1)              
Men 1.68  0.16  0.000   1.33  0.05  0.000    0.02 
Upper secondary  1.61  0.18  0.001   1.36  0.07  0.000    0.15 
University or more  3.06  0.35  0.000   1.99  0.11  0.000    0.00 
(3 - 10] years in the firm  1.03  0.07  0.633   1.19  0.04  0.000    0.02 
(10 - +) years in the firm  0.50  0.05  0.000   0.81  0.03  0.000    0.00 
Union 1.31  0.10  0.002   1.20  0.05  0.000    0.27 
In-house training  1.27  0.11  0.011   1.19  0.05  0.000    0.42 
External formal training  1.55  0.15  0.000   1.29  0.07  0.000    0.05 
Permanent worker   1.57  0.24  0.016   1.04  0.06  0.499    0.02 
Firm characteristics (Ho: coefficient=0)               
Capital assets  0.19  0.01  0.000   0.45  0.03  0.000     
Small firm  0.54  0.07  0.000   0.47  0.04  0.000     
North Region  0.59  0.07  0.000   0.41  0.03  0.000     
Center Region  0.48  0.06  0.000   0.50  0.04  0.000     
Mexico City  0.72  0.07  0.000   -0.23  0.03  0.000     
Sector 32  -0.25  0.06  0.000   -0.10  0.05  0.035     
Sector 33  -0.43  0.08  0.000   0.08  0.05  0.092     
Sector 34  -0.08  0.09  0.413   0.12  0.04  0.007     
Sector 35  0.05  0.08  0.533   -0.05  0.04  0.198     
Sector 36  -0.53  0.07  0.000   0.03  0.09  0.721     
Sector 37  0.14  0.15  0.372   -0.02  0.03  0.507     
Sector 38  -0.19  0.06  0.001   -0.03  0.08  0.732     
Sector 39  -0.25  0.14  0.072   0.00  0.00  0.002     
More than 50% of foreign capital  0.00  0.00  0.007   0.14  0.05  0.012     
The firm exports at least 50% of its 
products 0.18  0.09  0.053   0.04  0.03  0.176     
Research and development  0.01  0.05  0.918   0.13  0.04  0.001     
Quality Control  0.29  0.06  0.000   0.08  0.02  0.000     
Technology adoption  0.14  0.04  0.001                 
Adjusted R
2  0.84       0.93        
Number of observations (firms)  3,301                         
Notes: 
Own calculations based on ENESTYC 2001. The Wald statistic was used to test the equality of the 
estimated wage and productivity differential. 
Reference group for the worker characteristics: women, lower secondary or less, until three years of 
working experience in the firm, does not belong to a union, without training, temporary worker. 
Reference group for the firm characteristics: micro firms, South region, sector 31, the firm exports less than 
50% of its products, does no research and development, no quality control, no technology adoption. 
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TABLE A.3.  JOINT PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND WAGE EQUATION ESTIMATES 
MEDIUM AND LARGE FIRMS 
   Productivity equation (1)    Wages equation (2)     Prob. 
Variable  Coef.  Std. Error Prob.    Coef.  Std. Error  Prob.      i i o H λ φ = :
Worker characteristics (Ho: coefficient=1)             
Men 2.22  0.24  0.000    1.57  0.07  0.000    0.01 
Upper secondary  2.22  0.24  0.000    1.46  0.06  0.000    0.00 
University or more  5.09  0.57  0.000    2.72  0.11  0.000    0.00 
(3 - 10] years in the firm  1.25  0.10  0.014    1.15  0.04  0.000    0.33 
(10 - +) years in the firm  1.56  0.13  0.000    1.39  0.05  0.000    0.22 
Union 1.34  0.08  0.000    1.20  0.03  0.000    0.06 
In-house training  1.25  0.07  0.000    1.13  0.03  0.000    0.08 
External formal training  1.44  0.09  0.000    1.19  0.03  0.000    0.01 
Permanent worker   1.47  0.16  0.003    1.14  0.05  0.005    0.05 
Firm characteristics (Ho: coefficient=0)                
Capital assets  0.19  0.01  0.000             
Large firm  0.07  0.04  0.104    0.09  0.02  0.000     
North Region  0.15  0.06  0.011    0.17  0.03  0.000     
Center Region  0.17  0.06  0.002    0.17  0.03  0.000     
Mexico City  0.31  0.06  0.000    0.21  0.03  0.000     
Sector 32  -0.27  0.05  0.000    -0.13  0.03  0.000     
Sector 33  -0.42  0.09  0.000    -0.14  0.05  0.003     
Sector 34  0.02  0.06  0.719    0.17  0.03  0.000     
Sector 35  -0.08  0.05  0.092    0.09  0.02  0.000     
Sector 36  -0.40  0.06  0.000    0.00  0.04  0.924     
Sector 37  0.00  0.10  0.984    0.04  0.07  0.582     
Sector 38  -0.31  0.04  0.000    -0.04  0.02  0.059     
Sector 39  -0.33  0.17  0.056    -0.03  0.09  0.731     
More than 50% of foreign capital  0.00  0.00  0.000    0.00  0.00  0.000     
The firm exports at least 50% of 
its products  -0.06  0.04  0.152    -0.01  0.02  0.687     
Research and development  0.03  0.03  0.397    0.03  0.02  0.029     
Quality Control  0.12  0.03  0.000    0.10  0.02  0.000     
Technology adoption  0.06  0.04  0.086    0.01  0.02  0.575       
Adjusted R
2 0.69        0.82         
Number of observations (firms)  3,565                         
Notes: 
Calculations based on ENESTYC 2001. The Wald statistic was used to test the equality of the estimated 
wage and productivity differential. 
Reference group for the worker characteristics: women, lower secondary or less, until three years of 
working experience in the firm, does not belong to a union, without training, temporary worker. 
Reference group for the firm characteristics: medium firms, South region, sector 31, the firm exports less 
than 50% of its products, does no research and development, no quality control, no technology adoption. 
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TABLE A.4.  JOINT PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND WAGE EQUATION ESTIMATES 
   Productivity equation (1)   Wages equation (2)     Prob. 
Variable  Coef.  Std. Error Prob.    Coef.  Std. Error  Prob.     i i o H λ φ = :  
Worker characteristics (Ho: coefficient=1)               
Men within non trained workers  1.97  0.15  0.000   1.54  0.04  0.000    0.00 
In-house training within women  1.14  0.17  0.398   1.23  0.08  0.004    0.60 
External formal training within 
women  1.25 0.29  0.397   1.23 0.13  0.077    0.95 
In-house training within men  1.28  0.07  0.000   1.14  0.03  0.000    0.06 
External formal training within 
men  1.55 0.10  0.000   1.24 0.05  0.000    0.00 
Upper secondary  1.85  0.14  0.000   1.44  0.05  0.000    0.00 
University or more  3.81  0.28  0.000   2.39  0.08  0.000    0.00 
(3 - 10] years in the firm  1.12  0.05  0.024   1.19  0.03  0.000    0.15 
(10 - +) years in the firm  0.74  0.05  0.000   0.96  0.02  0.129    0.00 
Union 1.32  0.06  0.000   1.21  0.03  0.000    0.06 
Permanent worker   1.48  0.13  0.000   1.10  0.04  0.013    0.00 
Firm characteristics (Ho: coefficient=0)               
Capital assets  0.20  0.01  0.000            
Small firm  0.54  0.05  0.000   0.50  0.02  0.000     
Medium firm  0.65  0.08  0.000   0.62  0.02  0.000     
Large firm  0.70  0.10  0.000   0.71  0.02  0.000     
North Region  0.40  0.04  0.000   0.35  0.02  0.000     
Center Region  0.37  0.04  0.000   0.32  0.02  0.000     
Mexico City  0.56  0.05  0.000   0.38  0.03  0.000     
Sector 32  -0.31  0.04  0.000   -0.22  0.02  0.000     
Sector 33  -0.47  0.06  0.000   -0.14  0.03  0.000     
Sector 34  -0.01  0.05  0.794   0.13  0.03  0.000     
Sector 35  -0.04  0.04  0.292   0.08  0.02  0.001     
Sector 36  -0.50  0.05  0.000   -0.05  0.03  0.086     
Sector 37  0.03  0.09  0.726   0.03  0.06  0.676     
Sector 38  -0.28  0.04  0.000   -0.06  0.02  0.002     
Sector 39  -0.33  0.10  0.001   -0.07  0.06  0.234     
More than 50% of foreign capital  0.00  0.00  0.000   0.00  0.00  0.000     
The firm exports at least 50% of its 
products -0.02  0.05  0.705   0.02  0.03  0.383     
Research and development  0.02  0.03  0.561   0.04  0.02  0.013     
Quality Control  0.17  0.03  0.000   0.11  0.02  0.000     
Technology adoption  0.10  0.03  0.000   0.06  0.01  0.000      
Adjusted  R-squared  0.90       0.96        
Number of observations (firms)  6,662                        
Notes: 
Own calculations based on ENESTYC 2001. The Wald statistic was used to test the equality of the 
estimated wage and productivity differential. 
Reference group for the worker characteristics: women - no training, lower secondary or less, until three 
years of working experience in the firm, does not belong to a union, temporary worker. 
Reference group for the firm characteristics: micro firms, South Region, sector 31, the firm exports less 
than 50% of its products, does no research and development, no quality control, no technology adoption. 
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TABLE A.5.  JOINT PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND WAGE EQUATION ESTIMATES 
MICRO AND SMALL FIRMS 
   Productivity equation (1)   Wages equation (2)     Prob. 
Variable  Coef.  Std. Error Prob.    Coef.  Std. Error  Prob.     i i o H λ φ = :  
Worker characteristics (Ho: coefficient=1)               
Men within non trained workers  1.71  0.18  0.000   1.36  0.05  0.000    0.05 
In-house training within women  1.27  0.31  0.386   1.33  0.16  0.039    0.84 
External formal training within 
women  1.49 0.59  0.413   1.40 0.26  0.125    0.88 
In-house training within men  1.29  0.13  0.031   1.16  0.06  0.011    0.31 
External formal training within 
men  1.58 0.18  0.001   1.25 0.08  0.002    0.05 
Upper secondary  1.62  0.19  0.001   1.36  0.07  0.000    0.13 
University or more  3.03  0.35  0.000   1.96  0.11  0.000    0.00 
(3 - 10] years in the firm  1.03  0.07  0.646   1.19  0.04  0.000    0.02 
(10 - +) years in the firm  0.49  0.05  0.000   0.80  0.03  0.000    0.00 
Union 1.31  0.10  0.002   1.20  0.05  0.000    0.26 
Permanent worker   1.56  0.24  0.018   1.04  0.06  0.538    0.02 
Firm characteristics (Ho: coefficient=0)               
Capital assets  0.19  0.01  0.000            
Small firm  0.55  0.07  0.000   0.45  0.03  0.000     
North Region  0.60  0.07  0.000   0.48  0.04  0.000     
Center Region  0.49  0.06  0.000   0.41  0.03  0.000     
Mexico City  0.74  0.08  0.000   0.50  0.04  0.000     
Sector 32  -0.25  0.06  0.000   -0.23  0.03  0.000     
Sector 33  -0.45  0.08  0.000   -0.10  0.05  0.033     
Sector 34  -0.09  0.09  0.324   0.08  0.05  0.107     
Sector 35  0.03  0.08  0.670   0.11  0.04  0.016     
Sector 36  -0.53  0.07  0.000   -0.06  0.04  0.159     
Sector 37  0.11  0.16  0.477   0.04  0.09  0.654     
Sector 38  -0.20  0.06  0.001   -0.02  0.03  0.517     
Sector 39  -0.25  0.14  0.066   -0.02  0.08  0.747     
More than 50% of foreign capital  0.00  0.00  0.037   0.00  0.00  0.012     
The firm exports at least 50% of its 
products 0.19  0.09  0.039   0.15  0.06  0.009     
Research and development  0.02  0.06  0.750   0.05  0.03  0.136     
Quality Control  0.28  0.07  0.000   0.13  0.04  0.001     
Technology adoption  0.14  0.04  0.001   0.08  0.02  0.000      
Adjusted  R-squared  0.84       0.93        
Number of observations (firms)  3,250                        
Notes: 
Calculations based on ENESTYC 2001. The Wald statistic was used to test the equality of the estimated 
wage and productivity differential. 
Reference group for the worker characteristics: women – no training, lower secondary or less, until three 
years of working experience in the firm, does not belong to a union, temporary worker. 
Reference group for the firm characteristics: micro firms, South Region, sector 31, the firm exports less 
than 50% of its products, does no research and development, no quality control, no technology adoption. 
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TABLE A.6.  JOINT PRODUCTION FUNCTION AND WAGE EQUATION ESTIMATES 
MEDIUM AND LARGE FIRMS 
   Productivity equation (1)   Wages equation (2)     Prob. 
Variable  Coef.  Std. Error Prob.    Coef.  Std. Error  Prob.     i i o H λ φ = :  
Worker characteristics (Ho: coefficient=1)                
Men within non trained workers  2.12  0.35  0.001   1.70  0.12  0.000    0.22 
In-house training within women  1.24  0.25  0.346   1.29  0.11  0.007    0.86 
External formal training within 
women  1.39 0.36  0.282   1.27 0.15  0.074   0.76 
In-house training within men  1.23  0.09  0.007   1.08  0.03  0.027    0.07 
External formal training within men  1.44  0.11  0.000   1.16  0.05  0.001    0.02 
Upper secondary  2.25  0.25  0.000   1.46  0.06  0.000    0.00 
University or more  5.24  0.59  0.000   2.85  0.12  0.000    0.00 
(3 - 10] years in the firm  1.22  0.10  0.026   1.14  0.04  0.000    0.43 
(10 - +) years in the firm  1.62  0.14  0.000   1.41  0.05  0.000    0.13 
Union 1.34  0.08  0.000   1.20  0.03  0.000    0.07 
Permanent worker   1.43  0.15  0.005   1.14  0.05  0.005    0.07 
Firm characteristics (Ho: coefficient=0)              
Capital assets                   
Large firm  0.06  0.05  0.165   0.09  0.02  0.000     
North Region  0.14  0.06  0.020   0.16  0.04  0.000     
Center Region  0.16  0.06  0.006   0.16  0.04  0.000     
Mexico City  0.30  0.07  0.000   0.18  0.04  0.000     
Sector 32  -0.25  0.05  0.000   -0.13  0.03  0.000     
Sector 33  -0.40  0.09  0.000   -0.14  0.05  0.003     
Sector 34  0.03  0.06  0.653   0.16  0.03  0.000     
Sector 35  -0.07  0.05  0.119   0.09  0.03  0.001     
Sector 36  -0.40  0.06  0.000   0.01  0.04  0.806     
Sector 37  -0.01  0.11  0.929   0.04  0.07  0.610     
Sector 38  -0.29  0.04  0.000   -0.04  0.02  0.086     
Sector 39  -0.32  0.17  0.063   -0.03  0.09  0.712     
More than 50% of foreign capital  0.00  0.00  0.000   0.00  0.00  0.000     
The firm exports at least 50% of its 
products  -0.07 0.04  0.126   -0.01 0.02  0.614     
Research and development  0.02  0.03  0.581   0.04  0.02  0.024     
Quality Control  0.12  0.03  0.000   0.10  0.02  0.000     
Technology adoption  0.05  0.04  0.159   0.01  0.02  0.587      
Adjusted  R-squared  0.69       0.83        
Number of observations (firms)  3,412                        
Notes: 
Own calculations based on ENESTYC 2001. The Wald statistic was used to test the equality of the 
estimated wage and productivity differential. 
Reference group for the worker characteristics: women – no training, lower secondary or less, until three 
years of working experience in the firm, does not belong to a union, temporary worker. 
Reference group for the firm characteristics: medium firms, South Region, sector 31, the firm exports less 
than 50% of its products, does no research and development, no quality control, no technology adoption. 
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